“A Battle for Hearts and Minds”: U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Cold War Middle East by Goss, Christopher M
Ursinus College
Digital Commons @ Ursinus College
History Honors Papers Student Research
4-27-2015
“A Battle for Hearts and Minds”: U.S. Public
Diplomacy in the Cold War Middle East
Christopher M. Goss
Ursinus College, chgoss@ursinus.edu
Adviser: Richard King
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/history_hon
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and
the United States History Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. For more information, please contact
aprock@ursinus.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goss, Christopher M., "“A Battle for Hearts and Minds”: U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Cold War Middle East" (2015). History Honors
Papers. 1.
https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/history_hon/1
  
 
 
“A Battle for Hearts and Minds”: U.S. Public Diplomacy  
in the Cold War Middle East 
 
Chris Goss 
 
4/15/2015 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of Ursinus College in fulfillment of the 
requirements for Honors in History  
Goss 1 
 
 
“A Battle for Hearts and Minds”: U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Cold 
War Middle East 
Christopher Goss and Richard King (Mentor), History 
This paper analyzes the development of American public diplomacy in the Middle East region 
from 1945-1961. The purpose of the paper is to situate the public diplomacy effort within 
existing histories of the Middle East and Cold War propaganda and to analyze the methods used 
by the U. S. to shape foreign opinion. Analysis reveals that the U.S. felt the need to implement a 
foreign information program under President Truman, which was later expanded and corrected 
under Eisenhower, and included a switch from short-term objective seeking to long-term 
goodwill fostering. The methods were primarily focused on two target audiences: educated 
community leaders on one hand, and the masses on the other. This research highlights the 
successes of the previous U.S.  public diplomacy program which was later revived post-9/11, but 
has struggled to reduce anti-Americanism. 
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 In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the Council of Foreign Relations 
sponsored an independent task force to focus on determining the current situation of anti-
Americanism in the world.1 That Task Force found that negative views of the United States and 
its policies were growing and concluded that the growth of anti-Americanism constituted a threat 
to U.S. national security. The Task Force advocated for a vast expansion of U.S. public 
diplomacy to counteract this rising tide.2 Over the decade since the report was published global 
anti-Americanism has diminished; however, anti-Americanism in the Middle East remains 
incredibly high.3 
Within its executive summary the Task Force claims the United States must, “create a 
strong and robust public diplomacy—one able to win hearts and minds.”4 The use of such 
terminology is a deliberate call back to United States’ public diplomacy during the Cold War. 
During the Cold War-era the United States also sensed a need for an expanded program of public 
diplomacy to fight the Soviet Union. Cold War historian W. Scott Lucas states quite clearly, 
“The Cold War was a battle for hearts and minds.”5 However in spite of this reference to Cold 
War-era public diplomacy and the apparent necessity of such programs in the Middle East there 
is remarkably little scholarship on how the United States conducted public diplomacy in the 
Middle East during that period. This paper is about the various ways the United States practiced 
public diplomacy in the Middle East in the years 1945-1961 as a method of obtaining its national 
objectives. 
                                                          
1
 Bloomgarden, Kathy, Henry Grunwald, David E. Morey, Shibley Telhami, Jennifer Sieg, and Sharon 
Herbstman, Finding America's Voice: a Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2003. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Pew Research Center, “Global Attitudes and Trends” http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-1-
attitudes-toward-the-united-states/ (accessed 2/6/2015). 
4
 Bloomgarden, 3. 
5
 W. Scott Lucas, "Beyond Diplomacy: Propaganda and the History of the Cold War." in Cold War 
Propaganda in the 1950s. edited by Gary Rawnsley, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 11. 
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The purpose of the paper is to situate the public diplomacy effort within existing histories 
of the Middle East and Cold War propaganda and create a single narrative of the program’s 
development and changes over time. Additionally, it analyzes the methods used by the United 
States to shape foreign opinion. Analysis of the existing documentation reveals that the United 
States began to feel a need to implement a foreign information program in the late 1940s under 
President Truman as Cold War tensions began to rise. The program was later expanded and 
issues that plagued Truman were largely corrected under Eisenhower. These corrections included 
a switch from short-term objective seeking to long-term goodwill fostering during his second 
term in office after the Suez Crisis, but especially after 1958. The methods used by the United 
States were primarily focused on two target audiences: educated community leaders on one hand, 
and the masses on the other. As greater latitude was afforded to local offices toward the later 
1950s American propagandists were able to better tailor their material to fit local interests. 
There are several difficulties to studying public diplomacy in the Middle East, chiefly: 
what constitutes the Middle East, what is included in public diplomacy, and how does public 
diplomacy relate to foreign policy? For the purposes of this paper the “Middle East” will refer to 
the Arabic speaking countries from Egypt up to the border of Turkey as well as Iran. There are 
two reasons for selecting only these countries and not others that also share cultural ties such as 
North Africa, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. First, American officials during the Cold War 
tended to group the former countries together based on regional objectives and threats.6 The rise 
of revolutionary nationalist factors made this particular region of “the Middle East” of special 
interest to American policymakers as they sought to ensure stability in the region and prevent 
Soviet influence. Second and derivative of the first reason is the volume of documentation. When 
                                                          
6
 National Security Council, Executive Secretary Report to the United States, "United States Objectives and 
Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel" [Annex to NSC 129], April 7, 1952. 
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not speaking of the region as a whole, most of the documents focus on Egypt, Iraq and Iran. 
While Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and other countries are not fully ignored, there is a 
noticeable decrease in volume and outside of this region there is simply much less 
documentation. 
A greater difficulty lies perhaps in determining just what constitutes “public diplomacy.” 
It is important to note that the terms propaganda, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, 
psychological warfare and information activities all refer to the similar strategies and oftentimes 
officials use these terms interchangeably. I prefer the term public diplomacy as it does not hold 
the same connotations and limitations that can be applied to other terms. However, it must be 
recognized that as part of the wider attempt at influencing foreign public opinion, outright 
“propaganda” in the form of leaflets or bulletins were not viewed separately from more 
inconspicuous events such as jazz performances or educational exchanges. American propaganda 
in the Cold War was handled by many different agencies from the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to private parties such as book 
publishers and included everything from traditional print and radio to the student exchanges and 
jazz concerts. As Cold War historian Kenneth Osgood notes, “The battle for hearts and minds 
was waged not just with words, but also with deeds—actions calculated to have an impact on 
public perceptions.”7 To encompass all of these traits our definition of public diplomacy must be 
flexible, but not so vague as to make a distinction from traditional policy useless. Thus in the 
context of United States’ Cold War efforts, public diplomacy can be understood as any action 
undertaken to advance national objectives through changes to public opinion.  
                                                          
7
 Kenneth Alan Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006), 5. 
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Understanding just how public diplomacy interacted with policy is another challenge and 
constitutes one of the primary focuses of this paper. Although considered by some to constitute 
the “fourth dimension” of policymaking alongside diplomatic, economic and military actions, 
public diplomacy was not always seamlessly integrated into the policymaking process.8 When 
William Jackson, head of a committee tasked by Eisenhower with evaluating overseas 
propaganda remarked, “the ‘psychological’ aspect of policy is not separable from policy,” he 
highlights one of the goals of U.S. policymakers at the time, if not the reality.9 In the earliest 
stages of the Cold War U.S. policymakers determined that the Soviet Union was outperforming 
the United States in the amount of propaganda created and that this disparity could be 
detrimental to US prestige and thus national objectives.10 The early Cold War served as a type of 
evolutionary process where various programs rose and fell in an attempt to realize a synthesis 
close to Jackson’s ideal. 
The scholarship on United States Cold War public diplomacy is growing and experienced 
a large expansion within the past decade. Historians such as Kenneth Osgood, Scott Lucas and 
Gary Rawnsley have made large contributions to the understanding of the expansion of 
American propaganda activities and the psychological dimension of the Cold War.11 Several 
works detail the institutional histories of the Voice of America (VOA) and USIA. They provide 
greater understanding of the institutions operating in the Middle East albeit not covering 
                                                          
8
 Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
9
 “The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2, eds. Lisle A. Rose 
and Neal H. Petersen, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1983. 
10
 University of Michigan. Department of Near Eastern Studies Letter from George Cameron to Edward W. 
Barrett. [Propaganda Activities in Iraq; Attached to Cover Memorandum], October 24, 1951. National Archives. 
Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State. Decimal Files, 1950-1954. (Document 35) 
11
 Gary D. Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: the BBC and VOA in International Politics, 
1956-64, (NY: Macmillan Press, 1996). 
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activities there extensively.12 While scholarship exists on American intervention in the Middle 
East the psychological dimension is largely absent from these accounts with the exception of a 
few country specific articles.13 The most significant of these works focus on the role of the CIA 
in Iran and the overthrow of Mohamed Mossadeq.14 The most significant monograph on 
American Cold War propaganda in the Middle East is James R. Vaughan’s The Failure of 
American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957.15 Although Vaughan’s 
account is the most significant work on the topic, only half of the book is dedicated to American 
efforts in the area.  
This paper is divided into two parts and then further into chapters. The first part examines 
the formation and expansion of the American Cold War propaganda machine in general and how 
this manifested in the Middle East. Chapter 1 deals with American propaganda efforts from the 
Second World War through the Truman presidency. Chapter 2 focuses on the expansion and 
reorganization of propaganda activities from the beginning of the Eisenhower presidency in 1953 
through the Suez Crisis in 1956. The Third Chapter finishes with the latter half of the 
Eisenhower presidency. Part two of the paper focuses less on the organization of propaganda 
activities in the region and more on the methods employed as well as issues related to 
implementing propaganda as a policy tool. Chapter 4 deals with the “how” of U.S. public 
diplomacy including an examination of the means by which American officials sought to 
influence public opinion from radio and print media to educational exchanges. Chapter 5 
                                                          
12
 Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945, (WI: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1990). 
13
 Ahmed Khalid al-Rawi, "the Campaign of Truth Program." in Religion and the Cold War: A Global 
Perspective ed. Philip Emil Muehlenbeck, (TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), pp. 113-138. 
14
 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?: the CIA and the Cultural Cold War, (Granta Books, 
2000). 
15
 James Robert Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 
1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds, Cold War History Series, edited by Saki Dockrill. (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2005). 
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examines American policy objectives in the region through the lens of public diplomacy and the 
ways in which propaganda was hampered by various forces including tensions between agencies, 
British interests, and nationalism and concludes with an examination of the successes and 
limitations of the program. 
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Chapter 1: A Tenuous Start 
 American public diplomacy efforts during the Truman era were limited by a number of 
problems that prevented a truly cohesive propaganda apparatus from developing in the Middle 
East. Overall efforts were constrained by partisan politics, disorganization, and lack of funding. 
Significant progress in the Middle East was initially limited by a heavy focus on the Soviet 
threats to European interests. Comparing propaganda efforts during the Truman era with those 
during the war as well as the Eisenhower administration it appears as though the activities were 
in a state of hibernation at least until the Campaign of Truth—an injection of funds for the 
purpose of informing foreign audiences about the U.S.—began in 1950. However upon closer 
inspection, it is clear that without the initial strides made under Truman the subsequent successes 
in expanding American public diplomacy would not have been possible. Truman took the first 
steps in enacting propaganda tactics during peacetime and removing the majority of oversight of 
these programs from direct Congressional control by the early 1950s, thereby preventing 
Congress from questioning the program’s activities and further reorganizing and downsizing it.16 
The program during the Truman administration suffered from organizational flaws and 
inconsistent funding, but it was able to create the foundations of the program thereby allowing 
Eisenhower and later propagandists to build upon. 
During the course of World War II the United States amassed a significant propaganda 
network between the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS). James Vaughan states the number of people employed in propaganda activities at the end 
of the war was 5963, with an annual OWI budget of $80 million.17 According to Kenneth 
Osgood, by the end of the war 30,000 people were directly involved with psychological 
                                                          
16
 Shawn J. Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955, (CT: 
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), xxii. 
17
 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda, 12. 
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operations and had a total annual budget approximating $150 million.18 The discrepancy between 
these two numbers can be attributed to third and private parties who promoted American 
propaganda without being explicitly employed by the United States (the Writers’ War Board for 
example), as well as organizations outside of the OWI who also conducted “psychological” 
operations. In any case, it is clear that the United States was expending a large amount of funds 
and labor to project the American image abroad and counter Nazi propaganda.  
Following the end of the war, the American propaganda apparatus faced a massive 
reduction in size and funding. Dismantling of foreign information agencies was a logical step of 
post-war disarmament. Until this point it was a strange idea to allow propaganda to operate 
during peacetime and the public was wary of its use outside of war. Backlash during the 1920s 
and 1930s over domestic propaganda activities used in the First World War as well as 
perceptions of dishonesty connected with Nazi propaganda combined to create deep mistrust of 
propaganda in the public eye.19 Faced with mistrust from the public and skepticism from 
Congress, President Truman abolished the OWI in August of 1945. However, Truman believed 
that the operations conducted by the OWI were necessary to the future of U.S. policy and an 
integral part of foreign affairs. Truman managed to salvage some of the programs by transferring 
control to the Department of State. In doing so he was able to place the program under oversight 
from a historic and powerful agency that could weather Congressional onslaught.20 This move 
had the effect of presenting the public diplomacy program as a long term fixture of American 
foreign policy tools rather than a temporary wartime construction. Archibald MacLeish, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Affairs, was in charge of the Interim 
                                                          
18
 Osgood, 31. 
19
 Parry-Giles, 4. 
20
 Osgood, 32. 
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International Information Service. MacLeish worked with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to 
facilitate a way to keep the program running.21 
In December 1945 the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was 
formed to succeed the interim agency. This agency—also known abroad as the United States 
Information Service (USIS)—was charged with continuing to bring American propaganda to 
foreign audiences. After becoming assistant secretary of state in 1945 William B. Benton, a 
former radio advertiser, began the task of convincing Congress that the program was worth 
keeping. Benton faced two major challenges to his goal. First, Congressional opinion was such 
that “responsibility for telling foreigners about the U.S. should be left to private agencies of 
information.”22 Second, private news organizations had viewed the OWI as a possible competitor 
in the distribution of information abroad and convincing them to allow the OIC to enter the field 
posed a challenge.23 
Benton’s strategy was to convince Congress that the services provided by the State 
Department would not constitute propaganda, but rather an objective display of the facts of 
American life meant to educate foreign people. The State Department would work to supplement 
news agencies and would take a back seat to private news organizations where available. This 
idea became a core concept in later legislation in excerpts such as, “It is the intent of Congress 
that the Secretary shall encourage participation in carrying out the purposes of this chapter by the 
maximum number of different private agencies in each field consistent with the present or 
potential market for their services in each country.”24 This style of operation came to dominate 
public diplomacy in the Middle East and played a unique role in the success of American 
                                                          
21
 Shulman, 188. 
22
 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda,  12. 
23
 Parry-Giles, 5. 
24Pub. L. No. 80–402, 62 Stat. 6 (1948), “United States Information and Educational Exchange Act” of 
1948, (Smith-Mundt Act), U.S. Code 22 USC 1437 - Sec. 1437 Utilization of private agencies. 
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propaganda in the region. Meanwhile Benton contacted former OWI employees and various 
members of the media in a vast campaign to get the private media on his side. Ultimately, 
Benton was successful in getting the media to support his plans for a government sponsored 
information program abroad.25 
In spite of Benton’s successes with the media he found no traction with Congress until 
early in 1948. In 1946, Republicans took control of both houses and slashed funding for the 
fledgling organization. At this point Benton controlled just 2648 staff and was allocated only $13 
million, which Congress further reduced to $10 million in 1947. Looking solely at the official 
U.S. radio arm the Voice of America (VOA)—control of which had also been passed to the State 
Department in the postwar years—the organization suffered a loss of almost two-thirds of its 
personnel. The VOA went from offering services in over forty languages down to just twenty-
three and the Arabic service was one of the many languages the program lost.26 With massive 
cuts to funding and widespread lack of support, U.S. public diplomacy was left in dire straits. 
Yet, reorganization occurred once more in the summer of 1947, aimed at salvaging the program. 
The OIC was reorganized and renamed the Office of Information and Educational Exchange 
(OIE) although control of the organization still rested within the State Department.  
Change finally came in January 1948 with the passage of the US Information and 
Educational Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. The act was introduced 
by Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD), a former teacher who recognized the value of educating others 
on “the American way of life,” and cosponsored by Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ). This act 
formally allowed for an overseas propaganda service (as opposed to the interim activities 
supported by appropriations funding) by the United States during peacetime. It allowed “an 
                                                          
25
 Parry-Giles, 11. 
26
 William A. Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: the “Soft Power" of US Public Diplomacy in the 
Middle East, (CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 27. 
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information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people and 
policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible 
officials of government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs.”27 At first glance, 
considering the previous attitude of Congress toward propaganda it seems surprising that the 
Smith-Mundt Act passed, let alone with the speed and support it garnered—including unanimous 
support in the Senate. However, as Shawn Parry-Giles has suggested, the passage of the Smith-
Mundt act must be considered within the evolving Cold War atmosphere of the late 1940s.28  
Several key events converged to allow the Smith-Mundt Act to pass at the start of 1948. 
First, President Truman moved for the United States to provide economic support as well as 
civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey in response to unrest in both countries. This 
pledge codified U.S. policy to follow foreign advisor George F. Kennan’s ideas on 
“containment” or limiting expansion of Soviet influence, and was later referred to as the Truman 
Doctrine. During his statement he told Congress, “The free peoples of the world look to us for 
support in maintaining their freedoms” and in doing so aided the escalation of the Cold War.29 
Second, in June 1947 the United States began implementing the “Marshall Plan,” an economic 
recovery plan for European states ravaged by WWII. According to Truman, “The seeds of 
totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of 
poverty and strife.”30 Accordingly, the United States committed funds for the reconstruction of 
Europe to prevent communist and by extension, Soviet influence. Lastly, a Senate subcommittee 
traveled overseas in September and October of 1947 to investigate the need for public diplomacy 
                                                          
27
 Pub. L. No. 80–402, 62 Stat. 6 (1948), “Smith-Mundt Act.” 
28
 Parry-Giles, 13.  
29
 Truman, Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey March 12, 1947. 
30
 Truman, Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey March 12, 1947. 
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during peacetime.31 This trip impressed upon several senators the need for the United States to 
counter misinformation abroad and recommend the passing of the act. Ultimately, the survival of 
the program was closely tied to the expansion of the Cold War. Osgood explains this relationship 
when he states, “diplomacy became an extension of warfare, and propaganda became a critical 
weapon in this new type of international combat.”32 Congress was not becoming more relaxed on 
the issue of peacetime propaganda, but rather as the “Cold War” took shape, it began to envision 
relations with the Soviet Union as more hostile and thus necessitating an enhanced public 
diplomacy program. 
Shortly after the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in January 1948, former Ambassador to 
Iran George V. Allen was selected to succeed William B. Benton as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Public Affairs. This appointment was followed by another reorganization that abolished the 
OIE and established the United States Information and Educational Exchange program (USIE) 
which was divided into the Office of International Information (OII) and the Office of 
Educational Exchange (OEX). During this time the U.S. public diplomacy effort increased and 
greater funding allowed the program to expand, albeit slowly. It should be noted that in 
September 1947 the National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
National Security Council (NSC). Taking the place of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) the 
CIA also began to experiment with propaganda, although it was not until the 1950s that the 
organization was able to compete with the State Department. Osgood posits that the US 
propaganda effort was characterized by both “white”—open and official—and “black”—covert 
                                                          
31
 Parry-Giles, 12. 
32
 Osgood, 33. 
Goss 15 
 
or off-the-books—propaganda put forward by the USIS and CIA respectively.33 This distinction 
was not always applicable however, as many official programs had a hidden nature to them. 
Although Truman was reelected in 1948 it was Dean Acheson’s appointment as Secretary 
of State in January 1949 that marked another uptick in U.S. propaganda efforts. Acheson’s 
appointment brought a more “militaristic” approach to the situation with the Soviet Union. Major 
events in 1949 that helped to advance the need for a more proactive approach to the Cold War 
include the forming of NATO as well as the Soviet jamming of VOA broadcasts both in April 
and the formal establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October. Aside from a short 
distraction in which Edward W. Barrett succeeded George V. Allen only to be called up and 
challenged by Senator McCarthy on charges of communist infiltration of the State Department, 
the U.S. public diplomacy program only continued to grow.  
A large expansion took place during 1950. In April the National Security Council put 
forward its advisory paper NSC-68 which advocated the expansion of American information 
activities. Also, President Truman launched his “Campaign of Truth,” which promoted the need 
for enhanced information activities abroad to counter Soviet information activities. Truman’s 
calls were further bolstered by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. In the Middle East 
the State Department recognized a marked increase in anti-American sentiment. A message from 
Secretary of State Acheson states, “Anti-Americanism is resurging in the Arab world. The 
bombings at our legation in Beirut and Damascus; vitriolic public statements by Syria’s 
Dawalibi, Iraq’s Suwaidi and other high officials; diatribes and fantastic rumors in the vernacular 
press of Syria, Egypt and Iraq; all testify to the rekindling of Arab animosity against the United 
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 Osgood, 30. 
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States.”34  The VOA began Farsi Service broadcasts on March 21, 1949 and the Arabic service 
was resumed on January 1, 1950. Major book publishing service Franklin Publications was 
established in 1952 and major magazines such as the Lebanese “U.S.A. News Review” began 
circulation during the Campaign of Truth as well. By the early 1950s the Fulbright program had 
begun exchanging students with the Middle East. However while propaganda programs in the 
Middle East were increasing, the U.S. policy towards the region well into 1951 was primarily 
concerned with defending Greece and Turkey with some interest also focused on Iran.35  
The Campaign of Truth and increased Cold War tensions are reflected in increased 
funding for the information programs as well as a noticeable increase in documentation after 
1950. One year after NSC-68 the program was reorganized once again and Truman established 
the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). While previous reorganizations had been largely 
unsuccessful, the creation of the PSB in April 1951 helped to reign in an expanding bureaucratic 
apparatus that had begun to overlap and interfere with itself.36 The PSB acted as an autonomous 
agency controlling and organizing all aspects of psychological warfare in the battle against 
communism. Far more ambitious than previous incarnations the PSB sought to tie propaganda, 
covert action, foreign policy and diplomacy into a single concerted effort. In doing so it sought to 
achieve victory over the Soviet Union in the battle for hearts and minds.37 
In spite of their ambitious goals, there was significant dissatisfaction with the 
international information programs toward the end of the Truman administration. Another State 
Department reorganization established the United States International Information 
                                                          
34
 Department of State Airgram from Dean Acheson, [Anti-Americanism in the Arab World], May 1, 1950, 
National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State. Decimal Files, 1950-1954. 
35
 Department of State Report, "Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission (Istanbul, February 14-21, 
1951): Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations," c. February 21, 1951. 
36
 Osgood, 43. 
37
 Osgood, 44. 
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Administration (IIA) and neither the IIA nor the PSB much outlived the end of the Truman 
presidency. The Truman presidency in spite of its tumultuous start, laid the groundwork for the 
expansion of the propaganda apparatus that would take place under Eisenhower. While fraught 
with difficulty the members of the Truman administration successfully managed to enact 
legislation of a peacetime public diplomacy effort and construct a wide framework for later 
efforts. In the Middle East, major radio and print sources were put into place as well as several 
literature programs including independent publishers, the USIS, and universities. The work done 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s would enable the growth of US influence characteristic of 
the mid to late 1950s. 
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Chapter 2: Ironing out the Kinks 1952-1957 
 Under Eisenhower, the program was expanded in response to threat of revolutionary 
nationalism and the possibility of Soviet intrusion. However, while many of the organizational 
flaws were corrected during the first portion of Eisenhower’s presidency, the program was still 
forced to react to short-term objectives that were prone to change; thus the program was unable 
to present a consistent message, hindering its effectiveness.  
There are two main factors to consider when analyzing the development of Middle 
Eastern public diplomacy under Eisenhower. First, Eisenhower was a staunch supporter of 
propaganda and the ‘psychological’ aspect of the Cold War. He became the only president to 
appoint a propaganda advisor to the presidential cabinet when he appointed Charles Douglass 
(C.D.) Jackson—a protégée of Time Magazine’s Henry Luce—in 1952.38  Eisenhower had an 
active role in shaping national security affairs especially as they related to propaganda; Kenneth 
Osgood asserts, “Largely as a result of Eisenhower’s personal leadership, psychological warfare 
assumed a place of prominence in the making of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s.”39  
 Second, during the 1950s areas outside of Europe began to take on new importance in 
Cold War geopolitics. During the Truman administration Cold War containment strategy was 
largely focused on preventing communist infiltration of Western Europe. By the time the 
Eisenhower administration took office, fears had abated of a communist takeover of a weakened 
postwar Europe and priorities had shifted elsewhere. The Jackson Report, otherwise known as 
the Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, 
states, “The immediate problem is the prevention of further Soviet territorial expansion, 
particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia where there is serious danger of continued 
                                                          
38
 Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War, (PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 51. 
39
 Osgood, 6. 
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deterioration of the free world’s position.”40 Policymakers in America realized as early as 1952 
that the position of the United Kingdom in the Middle East was probably going to collapse, and 
that a possible power vacuum caused by a French and English absence could leave the region 
open to Soviet infiltration.41 The possibility of the British withdrawal from the region, as well as 
growing revolutionary nationalist sentiment, convinced the United States that it was necessary to 
ensure that should any regime fall in the Middle East, the government that would follow would 
be pro-West, or at the very least non-communist.42 Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and Iran’s 
Mohammad Mossadeq were two are just two examples of nationalist leaders who threatened 
U.S. interests; when Mossadeq’s nationalization of Iran’s oil fields created the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Crisis, it resulted in the United States and United Kingdom conspiring to overthrow him 
primarily through negative propaganda. 
It is against this backdrop of support for propaganda programs and increased interest in 
Middle East affairs that U.S. public diplomacy grew. It should be noted, however, that in spite of 
the Eisenhower administration’s rhetoric in support of propaganda, many of the prior problems 
were still present. Lauren Belmonte posits, “the administration’s strong support for propaganda 
activities did not stop the political machinations, fiscal uncertainties, and bureaucratic 
impediments that often undermined U.S. information programs.”43 While, many of these 
limitations did not disappear immediately during the Eisenhower presidency, it is clear that the 
programs enjoyed greater flexibility and power under Eisenhower than previously and that by the 
end of his presidency the U.S. public diplomacy program was in much better shape. 
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While Eisenhower was not inaugurated until January 1953, he had already been making 
moves to implement his vision since November 1952.  Eisenhower appointed C.D. Jackson to 
the presidential cabinet to advise him on propaganda in December 1952 before holding his first 
pre-inaugural cabinet meeting. Just six days after his inauguration Eisenhower commissioned an 
investigation into international information policies and national security. This investigation 
became known as the Jackson Committee after its chair William H. Jackson. William Jackson 
had previously served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and is credited along with 
General ‘Beadle’ Smith and Allen Dulles with the restructuring and expansion of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. With funding from the CIA, the Jackson Committee conducted a six month 
investigation of U.S. information services abroad and their relation to national security.  
Before Eisenhower received the results of the Jackson Committee Report in June 1953 he 
encountered a significant challenge in February of 1953. Senator Joseph McCarthy once again 
targeted the State Department as part of his crusade against communist infiltration of the United 
States. Unlike his previous attempt however, McCarthy now had sufficient backing to conduct an 
official investigation into the department and bring it before a Senate subcommittee. McCarthy 
focused mainly on two organs of the State Department: the Voice of America and USIS libraries 
abroad.  
McCarthy’s investigation of the VOA concentrated on the perceived softness of criticism 
of communism among VOA broadcasts as well as what he saw as questionably placed 
transmitters. Viewed together he claimed that these constituted proof of a communist conspiracy 
in the State Department.44 McCarthy’s claims of the VOA’s position are somewhat at odds with 
the reality of VOA programming in the Middle East during the same period. While McCarthy 
viewed the VOA as not promoting enough of an anticommunist stance, observers in Beirut in 
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February 1952 noted that the VOA broadcasts were “too propagandistic.”45 McCarthy’s 
pressures forced Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to fire VOA engineer George Herrick and 
accept the resignation of the head of the IIA Dr. Wilson Compton. While this struck a blow to 
the IIA and VOA in general, the broadcasts in the Middle East were already scant and arguably 
ineffective when compared with other more established broadcasts such as the BBC.46 
McCarthy’s inquiry may have deterred the VOA from adopting a less ‘propagandistic’ stance but 
the VOA during the Truman era and early Eisenhower years was still an afterthought. 
McCarthy’s investigation of the USIS libraries had a greater effect on U.S. public 
diplomacy in the Middle East. USIS libraries, in addition to USIS press releases and columns 
released to local papers, formed the mainstay of the American propaganda program. By 1954, 
the United States operated over forty libraries in the area stretching from the Middle East 
through Southeast Asia. As James Vaughan makes clear, the USIS libraries in the Middle East 
enjoyed an enthusiastic welcome coupled with significant readers and borrowers.47 Thus, when 
McCarthy targeted the libraries as part of his investigation he struck directly at one of the pillars 
of the U.S. information program. Shawn Parry-Giles states “books were a key component of the 
State Department’s propaganda operation that were likewise integral to the Psychological 
Strategy Board’s (PSB) Doctrinal Warfare and Escapee Programs.”48 This assertion is perhaps 
especially true in the Middle East when one considers the relative success of the U.S. library 
program when compared with the British counterpart during a time when the United Kingdom 
boasted higher production and dissemination as well as more entrenched programs than the 
United States in most other areas.  
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McCarthy asserted that the USIS libraries were filled with books by communist or 
communist-affiliated authors and was able to convince other members of the subcommittee that 
the presence of such books was actively hurting the American effort.49 In the end, the committee 
found that the State Department had sponsored communist affiliated authors and over 30,000 
books were written by communists or contained a pro-communist message.50 When one 
considers that the average USIS library contained 7,500-10,000 books, it is clear that at least 
several of the Middle East libraries were affected by this decision.51 The ultimate outcome was 
Dulles’ issuing of Information Guide 272 which banned the use of communist material by the 
IIA in February 1953.  
There are both positive and negative outcomes from McCarthy’s investigation that 
shaped the U.S. public diplomacy program for at least the next two years. On one hand, 
McCarthy’s criticisms of the program put pressure on the State Department to implement a more 
obviously heavy-handed attack on communism. Such pressures were at odds with 
recommendations in the Middle East at the time that recommended the United States begin to 
take a more neutral approach. In Iran specifically, the recommendation toward operations in the 
period during and after the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis stressed caution and neutrality to further 
good relations.52 In a telling memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Iran to the Department of 
State in May 1953, Ambassador Loy Henderson refutes the claim that the USIS office in Iran 
had in any way been lax on its criticism of international communism. Henderson begins the 
memorandum by stating, “In view of the unfair and distorted criticism which has at times been 
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made of the failure of the USIS office in Tehran to combat communism I have asked Mr. Wells 
[a Public Affairs Officer in Tehran] to prepare this memorandum.”53 The memorandum 
demonstrates that while the USIS program in Iran attempted to be subtle to avoid criticism from 
the Iranian government it nevertheless worked diligently to promote the cause of the United 
States and fight communism. 
On a positive note is the role McCarthy played in placing the U.S. information program 
further under executive control and further from Congressional oversight and possible meddling. 
Shawn Parry-Giles asserts that in respect to Eisenhower’s response to McCarthy, “Eisenhower’s 
silence fostered a revision in the propaganda program’s mission and structure, which further 
shifted the locus of power for propaganda operations from Congress and the State Department to 
the White House.”54 McCarthy was successful in eroding trust in the State Department and 
prompting calls to lessen or separate the international information program from the State 
Department. As February 1953 came to a close, Eisenhower and Dulles separated the IIA from 
the State Department and appointed Dr. Robert L. Johnson director following Compton’s 
resignation. 
The erosion of trust in the State Department’s ability to effectively oversee the 
international information program is visible in the suggestions put forth by the various 
committees tasked with analyzing the program and determining its future. In addition to the 
Jackson Committee, two other committees were also tasked with evaluating the international 
information program: the Hickenlooper Committee and the Rockefeller Committee. The 
Hickenlooper Committee was a public inquiry by the Senate under the leadership of Bourke B. 
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Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) into the failings of the IIA in meeting the expectations placed upon it by 
the Senate.55 The committee formed February 20, 1953 which places its creation during the 
center of the McCarthy investigation into the State Department and it is clear that its creation 
was spurred by the investigation. The ultimate consensus in the Hickenlooper Committee was 
that the current system was in some way flawed, although whether to split the program from the 
State Department or simply give it more latitude and discretion was still a matter of debate.56 
In contrast with the Hickenlooper Committee, the Rockefeller Committee—chaired by 
Nelson Rockefeller who later became Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs—
was much more firm in its conviction that the international information program should be 
removed from the State Department. The report was given to the president on April 7, 1953 and 
recommended the creation of a new foreign information agency under the supervision of the 
National Security Council (NSC). Keeping in mind that the NSC is a White House institution 
designed to coordinate Cabinet departments, such a move would place both covert operations 
(CIA) and non-covert actions under presidential control. The other recommendation of the 
Rockefeller Committee was that the VOA should only broadcast “official United States’ 
positions.”57 Such a strategy is reflective of the atmosphere and thinking that characterized 
officials in Washington during the height of McCarthy’s power.  
One of the issues with taking the stance that the VOA should only broadcast official 
policy is that it lacks the power of plausible deniability. Throughout the U.S. propaganda effort, 
one of the key themes was the presentation of material as a neutral or third-party when in fact it 
was actually U.S.-backed propaganda. One example of this is espoused in a telegram from 
Dulles to the embassy in Iran which stated, “It is sometimes possible for Department to inspire 
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editorials or articles in the U.S. publications…Additionally, VOA might pick up such editorials 
or articles and play them on Persian program without any indication U.S. inspiration.”58 The 
push for more obvious propaganda from Washington was certainly at odds with this policy and 
created a gap between the expectations at home and implementation abroad. The above telegram 
is dated June 26, 1953, which is after the committee’s suggestions had reached the president, and 
so it appears that as with Information Guide 272—which Dulles rescinded in March 1953—the 
impact of McCarthy on the program as a whole began to abate after the formation of the USIA. 
The United States Information Agency (USIA) was created in June 1953 on the 
combined suggestions of the three committees. Shawn Parry-Giles notes that the Jackson 
Committee was the most influential in shaping the future of the U.S. propaganda program and 
that a key theme of the Jackson Committee Report was “that the U.S. propaganda program under 
Truman suffered from a lack of centralized leadership that resulted in confusion over the 
program’s mission.”59 The report then called for the White House to take the reins on the mission 
and elevate the significance of the program in the overall Cold War effort.60 The creation of the 
USIA was the final restructuring of the U.S. international information effort for the next 45 years 
and ended the constant bureaucratic shifts that had plagued the Truman programs.  
Unfortunately, while the bureaucratic restructuring of the program was resolved the 
program once again faced budget concerns. Confidence in the program was still recovering from 
McCarthy’s onslaught and before the USIA could mount a defense Congress cut funding by 36 
percent as well as reducing staff by 25 percent and closing 38 of the overseas posts.61 While such 
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a reduction was a sharp blow to the agency as a whole, the program in the Middle East region 
actually managed to increase over this period thanks to increased U.S. interest in several key 
events. 
The U.S. public diplomacy effort in the Middle East was spurred by two drastic events 
during the period from 1952-1957: the 1953 Iranian Coup and the Suez Crisis. While the rise of 
nationalism generally generated considerable U.S. interest in Iraq and Kuwait as well, it was 
these two developments that allowed the Middle East program to grow in the face of budget 
cutbacks.  
The Mossadeq government and the 1953 coup provide an interesting case for the growth 
of U.S. propaganda in the region. The CIA was engaged in a massive propaganda operation 
aimed at destabilizing the regime and played a large role in the eventual 1953 coup. CIA 
propaganda was primarily aimed at undermining support for Mossadeq among the Iranian 
populace by demonstrating that his policies were inviting disaster and emphasizing that he was 
changing Iran for the worse. Declassified summary reports note, “In Iran, CIA and SIS 
propaganda assets were to conduct an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through the 
press, handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken the Mossadeq 
government in any way possible.” Additionally, “In the United States, high-ranking US officials 
were to make official statements which would shatter any hopes held by Premier Mossadeq that 
American economic aid would be forthcoming, and disabuse the Iranian public of the Mossadeq 
myth that the United States supported his regime.”62 Thus the coup was made possible by both 
overt and covert public diplomacy. Examples of CIA propaganda show that the propaganda was 
written to appear as originating from Iranians themselves.  Some were aimed at denouncing 
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Mossadeq’s policies such as those on landownership or the army, “We too want to save Iran 
from the landowners but we wondered what Mossadeq does with this money. Does he use it to 
help our farmers buy their own land? No Mossadeq uses this money to build up his private spy 
service.”63 Other propaganda attempts were designed to reflect not on Mossadeq’s policies but 
on souring public opinion and perceived negative changes, for example, “Ever since the alliance 
between the dictator Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party, Iranians have been less polite, less 
hospitable, and less tolerant. Iranians have been rude, rough, and unfriendly. Many of our people 
are acting more like Bolsheviks than like Iranians.”64 The CIA disseminated propaganda of this 
nature through Iranian intermediaries, and combined with other forms of U.S. public diplomacy, 
successfully contributed to a coup in August 1953. 
Following the ouster of Mossadeq the USIA rapidly stepped up efforts in Iran to try and 
capitalize on the situation. Efforts to negotiate with the Iranian Censorship Commission which 
had been stalled suddenly shifted gears and the USIS began to prepare anticommunist films in 
Persian.65 A concerted effort was made “To convince Iran leaders and public [of the] desirability 
[of] definitely aligning themselves with West” by citing the dubious nature of Soviet friendships, 
touting the history of U.S. aid to Iran as a way to overcome “outsider” stigma and prove a no-
strings-attached relationship, and applauding the actions of Iranians who showed pro-West 
sympathies or actions.66  
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The increase in activity following the return of the Shah was focused on the Shah’s pro-
Western stance as well as the economic assistance provided by the United States.67 Additionally, 
the USIS branch in Iran submitted a request for increased grant funding and an increase in 
staffing to meet the demand for USIS programs during this period.68 This request for increased 
funding and staff is again reflected in the 1954 NSC plan for the region in which a greater role 
for the information program is elaborated. In describing the necessary actions it states, “Such an 
offensive will require, first, an expansion of USIS personnel and operating expenses in the 
nations of the Near East, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan of about 25% together with an equivalent 
increase in Washington backstopping and expenses.”69 This request was also coupled with a 
request for the construction of additional information centers, textbooks, radio programming, and 
study programs for people in leadership roles or possible futures in leadership.70 
Lastly, regarding the rise of U.S. propaganda efforts in the Middle East during this period 
was the deteriorating relations between Egypt and the British. Just as the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Crisis prompted the United States to take a greater role in Iran, so too did the growing 
antagonism of Anglo-Egyptian relations allow the United States to play a larger role in the 
region as a whole as the British were forced from their areas of greatest control. As Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser rose to heightened prominence in the Arab nationalist scene 
during the mid-1950s, his anti-colonial rhetoric succeeded in diminishing British prestige in the 
region allowing the United States to increasingly fill the gap left by the British. The Suez Crisis 
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marks a distinct shift of power in the Middle East where the United States becomes the 
hegemonic western power in the region supplanting the United Kingdom. This provided a boon 
to the USIS program as it was no longer forced to concede to British interests in some areas and 
compete for the same viewers. 
In summation, the early Eisenhower era was still troubled by many of the same issues 
that had proved problematic for the Truman administration. Budget cuts and reorganization 
combined with the upheaval caused by McCarthyism and questions regarding the program’s 
shortcomings. However, for all of the issues at the outset of the Eisenhower administration the 
program in the Middle East managed to grow sizably during this period. The emerging power 
vacuum in the Middle East necessitated increasing attention to the region made while stability in 
Western Europe allowed attention to be diverted from this previously priority area. Historian 
Wilson P. Dizard points out that by the late 1950s the USIA was in “healthy organizational 
shape.”71 The program struggled during this period with adjusting to policy changes; however, 
this would change during Eisenhower’s second term in office. Ultimately, it can be concluded 
that by 1957 the United States had supplanted Britain as the most prominent propaganda force in 
the Middle East and that the program there was growing steadily. 
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Chapter 3: Shifting Priorities, the Program after 1958. 
 Following the Suez crisis and the declaration of the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ in 1957, 
relations in the Middle East were in dire straits. The institutional issues that had plagued the U.S. 
public diplomacy program were largely gone or mitigated but opposition to the overall policies 
of the United States were another story. Anti-Americanism abounded and as James Vaughan 
notes, “by January 1957, large swaths of the Arab world, particularly in the urban and 
intellectual centers, had come to regard the United States with deep suspicion, if not outright 
hostility.”72 USIS agents were fighting an uphill battle and other foreign policy concerns began 
to take precedence over those in the Middle East. The U.S. program in the later Eisenhower 
years was categorized by increased latitude and decision-making at the regional and local levels, 
as well as a shift away from short-term programs toward a more long-term strategy of promoting 
goodwill and inculcating American values into future generations. This shift away from direct 
American meddling in the region toward accomodation was echoed by U.S. policy in the Middle 
East overall. 
Increasingly those in the United States recognized that they were losing the battle for 
hearts and minds in the Middle East and heightened censorship limited USIS options. Barring 
several incidents in which USIS libraries and posts became the focus of violent attacks, the 
program continued to produce material. The decision to abolish the Operations Coordinating 
Board (OCB) by President Kennedy in February 1961 further divorced the USIA from policy 
decisions and diminished the ability of the program to conduct propaganda as an extension of 
policy. At first these developments suggest that the program was less effective than in previous 
years; however, the program after this point is characterized by a shift from the primacy of short-
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term policy objectives to a long game of reducing anti-Americanism that is mirrored by the late 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations’ attempts to reduce tensions between the United States 
and Nasser, as well as between the various states in the region. 
In March 1957 Congress approved increased funding to the Middle East in an effort to 
combat the rising tide of anti-Americanism and ensure their ability to follow through on the 
declarations put forth by the Eisenhower Doctrine. This move illustrated that the United States 
was unwilling to let the Soviet Union gain any type of foothold in the Middle East, but it also 
demonstrated its commitment to fight Nasserism. However in spite of these measures, the U.S. 
relationship with the Middle East was at an all-time low. Nasser’s Voice of the Arabs was 
drowning out U.S. attempts to utilize the airways and Nasser assailed the Eisenhower Doctrine as 
an effort by the United States to divide and conquer Arabs. His heightened prestige after his 
perceived success at Suez made him a powerful symbol for resisting the West and promoting 
change.73 Historian Roby C. Barrett posits that under a constant barrage of propaganda from 
Arab nationalists, the United States was forced to switch strategies and search for a new 
paradigm with which to conduct diplomacy with the Middle East.74 
The creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR)—a fusion of Egypt and Syria—in 
February 1958 marked the start of this switch. Nasser did not support the full merger of the 
countries but his fear of a communist controlled Syria forced his hand. Although some were still 
suspicious of Nasser’s motives—especially considering he made a trip to the Soviet Union in 
May—the United States began an effort to work with Nasser and to bring US-Egyptian relations 
out of a deep freeze.75 Talks of reestablishing meaningful diplomatic relations with Egypt were 
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already under consideration—at the very least between top officials like Eisenhower and 
Dulles—however the formation of the UAR provided the impetus for the United States to act.76 
The NSC had already expressed the possibility in late January of “Demonstrating to the Arab 
states that we are prepared to support political measures looking toward a system of strong and 
independent sovereign states in the area, including the union of two or more Arab states.”77  
These new efforts were tentative and could not be conveyed to the larger public for fear 
of alienating pro-Western states such as Lebanon who feared Nasser’s influence. Additionally 
the possibility that outright U.S. support for Arab nationalism posed a direct threat to pro-
Western regimes and could facilitate Egyptian domination of the region could not be ignored.78 
More anti-American protests swept the Middle East in May 1958, the same month in which 
Christian President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon decided to suspend the single term served by 
Lebanese leaders. Since 1943 the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon had alternated control over 
the government, and Chamoun feared that the positive response of Lebanese Muslims to the 
creation of the UAR endangered the sovereignty of Lebanon. Chamoun’s fears caused him to 
reach out to the United States as well as the other members of the Baghdad Pact and paved the 
way for America’s decision in July of 1958 to send troops to the Middle East, which proved the 
definitive turning point for U.S. policy in the Middle East including the public diplomacy 
program.  
On July 14, 1958 the Hashemite monarchy that the British installed in Iraq after the First 
World War was deposed by Arab nationalists within the Iraqi army. The forces that had been 
mobilized to offer support to Chamoun in Lebanon never made it past Baghdad. Both King 
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Faisal II and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were killed during the coup. The fall of one of the most 
pro-Western governments in the region was a significant blow to U.S. and British interests in the 
region. Prior to the coup in Iraq, Chamoun’s petitions to the United States for military support 
had been unsuccessful; however, Eisenhower deployed 14,000 marines to Lebanon the day after 
the coup to preserve stability. The decision to deploy troops in the Middle East was condemned 
throughout the region. BBC documentation of the Egyptian radio broadcasts contains phrases 
such as “America is aggressing against the Lebanon,” and “America is hurling its soldiers into 
the Lebanon.”79 Ultimately, the combinations of these events would force a change in U.S. 
policy toward the Middle East. 
James Vaughan states that in regard to U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, “The 
primacy of short-term political objectives, driven by the contingencies of the cold war, was thus 
quickly established.”80 By the late 1950s however, U.S. public diplomacy underwent a shift 
away from short-term objective seeking. Additionally Roby Barrett posits that 1958 marked the 
definitive turning point in U.S. diplomatic strategy toward the Middle East.81 He notes that prior 
to 1958 the administration’s goals had been too high in seeking to exert control and address all 
the issues in the Middle East; after 1958 the strategy is much more focused on modest aims to 
reduce opposition to U.S. aims.82 Indeed a memorandum between Eisenhower and John Foster 
Dulles on July 20th explicitly states, “Mr. Allen Dulles said it is not only nationalism that is 
involved in the Middle East—with which we could reach an accommodation—but also pan-
Arabism, which takes the form of anti-Westernism and opposition to Israel.”83 In spite of their 
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misgivings regarding the new powers in the Middle East they concluded, “Mr. Allen seemed to 
feel we should make a deal with the new Arab groups. Mr. Allen confirmed that he suggested we 
learn to live with the new groups. The President thought it was clear we must win them to us, or 
adjust to them.”84 I contend that this strategy continued into the propaganda efforts in the Middle 
East and marks a transition to a public diplomacy program much more in line with supporting 
nationalist sentiment as opposed to fighting a losing battle against it. The statement ‘we must win 
them to us’ was as much a reflection of using diplomacy to forge ties with the governments in 
the UAR and Iraq as it was winning acceptance of continued U.S. participation in the region. 
In a National Security Council memorandum dated to July 24, 1958 USIA Director 
George V. Allen pushed for accommodation with nationalist forces in the Middle East; it states, 
“Mr. Allen argued for an adjustment with nationalist forces in the Middle East before it is too 
late.”85 Just a week later on July 31 Eisenhower wrote in a letter to Dr. Edward Lee Roy Elson 
(later Chaplain of the United States Senate) that, “this administration has never been antagonistic 
to Arab nationalism…I think possibly we have failed to make this clearly apparent to our Arab 
friends.”86 He then goes on to praise Allen and note that the USIA will follow a more consistent 
approach on this matter.87 The NSC documentation from January had previously mentioned an 
increased effort on the part of the United States to foster goodwill in the region stating a desire 
to, “Strengthen U.S. training, cultural, educational, information, and personnel exchange 
programs, and stimulate private U.S. activities in the area, and continue technical assistance 
programs for these purposes. Seek to create a climate favorable to the United States through the 
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maximum encouragement of effective direct relations between U.S. citizens and peoples of the 
area.”88 This desire to foster goodwill had not been fully realized by July as indicated by Allen’s 
frustration. Thus we can look to Allen and Eisenhower’s comments at this time to truly reflect a 
switch in the U.S. public diplomacy program that mirrored the slower more measured approach 
to the Middle East. 
One possible counter-argument to this interpretation is that John Foster Dulles quickly 
changed his opinion regarding the ability of the United States to accommodate Nasser’s version 
of Arab nationalism. In response to a letter from Eisenhower regarding two letters the president 
had received advocating supporting Nasser, he wrote the president on July 25th to state, “We are 
basically wholly sympathetic with Arab nationalism if it means a constructive and productive 
unity of the Arab peoples. Unfortunately, Nasser’s brand of Arab nationalism does not seem to 
be leading to that.”89 However, while Dulles was not wholly convinced of the ability of the 
United States to accommodate Nasser, Eisenhower’s letter to Elson supports the idea that the 
administration would continue to do so. In any case it is doubtful that even the most skilled 
USIA propagandists could promote U.S. support of Arab nationalism as a whole while 
adequately underscoring the downsides of Nasser’s vision. 
The final move by the Eisenhower administration to shape propaganda, if not specifically 
that of the Middle East was his ‘People-to-People’ campaign. In December 1959 Eisenhower 
launched a goodwill tour that encompassed nine countries including Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia, Greece, India, Spain, France and Italy. Such a goodwill tour by a 
president was unprecedented and started a long tradition of trips by US presidents. The USIA 
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capitalized on the event and made ‘Ike’ and the trip the highlight of much of the propaganda in 
1959. It should be noted that while Eisenhower did visit Iran and several countries considered 
part of the ‘Greater Middle East’ including Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
he did not visit any of the Arab countries in the core Middle East area. This is indicative of two 
realities, the first being the continuing tense relations between the United States and Arab states 
in the Middle East and the second being a shift in American diplomacy toward other countries in 
Asia and Africa that were considered vulnerable to Soviet influence. 
When the Kennedy administration took over in 1961 it did not significantly alter the 
operations of the U.S. public diplomacy program in the Middle East. The quick response 
operating style that had characterized the early Eisenhower years had been fully replaced by the 
longer goal of fostering goodwill. Kennedy appointed CBS correspondent Edward R. Murrow to 
head the USIA. In February 1961 Kennedy abolished the OCB which further removed the USIA 
from the policymaking process.90 This move was somewhat reconciled by Kennedy giving 
Murrow a direct telephone line and inviting him to personally sit in on meeting, but Murrow 
chose to avoid using those options.91 
Thus propaganda activities in the Middle East became less of a focus during the years 
after Eisenhower and before events of the Carter presidency brought more immediate attention to 
the region. Attention was increasingly given to Cuba, Vietnam, the Space Race and emerging 
developing countries in Africa and Asia. The USIA during this time generally saw an increase in 
budgets and a degree of stability perhaps unimaginable to propagandists of the late 1940s or 
early 1950s. USIA historian Wilson P. Dizard notes, “Perhaps its greatest gain from its past years 
of successes and failures was a deeper recognition that quick-fix solutions designed to influence 
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overseas opinion almost never worked. In effect, the organization had settled down to the 
realization that any significant progress would be the result of steady long-term efforts.”92 
Dizard’s interpretation of the USIA is emblematic of the operations in the Middle East in the 
time after mid-1958 and onward. American public diplomacy from the later Eisenhower years 
onward is characterized by this shift to long-term goals and a steady influence over values and 
cultural ties above swift changes to public opinion in the promotion of new policies in the region. 
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Chapter 4: Evaluating U.S. Propaganda Methods 
 Just as the unique political occurrences in the Middle East necessitated U.S. 
propagandists to tailor their material to these events; the social and cultural situation of the 
Middle East also shaped both the materials and methods through which the United States could 
conduct public diplomacy. Print media such as books and magazines, radio broadcasts, and 
movies formed the mainstay of U.S. activities; however, these “traditional” means of propaganda 
were not the only means through which the U.S. attempted to influence Middle Eastern 
audiences and propagandists actively sought ways to inject psychological considerations into a 
variety of U.S. activities.93 Educational exchange and cultural exhibits are just two examples of 
the nonconventional means through which the United States attempted to affect foreign 
perceptions of itself in the region. U.S. propagandists divided their projects toward two groups. 
To the literate population of the Middle East they targeted print media and educational 
opportunities in order to gain favor with powerful groups within the various countries. On the 
other hand, they targeted the masses mainly with culture and simple news stories to ensure 
stability. 
The United States attempted to shape public perception in the Middle East in myriad 
ways including both overt and covert operations as well as the formation of a significant state-
private network. The majority of operations covered in this paper concern what Kenneth Osgood 
describes as “white” propaganda activities; that is to say those activities pursued under the 
direction of the State Department or USIA and openly acknowledged as information programs of 
the United States.94 Covert or “black” operations such as those conducted by the CIA have not 
been neglected; however, these operations must be viewed as short-term strategic maneuvers 
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compared to the more long-standing institutions that formed “white” operations. Additionally the 
state-private bonds that were created operated in a “gray” zone, and blurred the line between the 
white and black activities. Many of these agreements were officially sanctioned State 
Department activities though this connection was often hidden or not publicized—the connection 
between Franklin Publications and the U.S. government, for example.95 
Broadcasting and Radio Diplomacy: 
On the surface one could conclude that due to the large role played by Radio Free Europe 
and the Voice of America in American propaganda activities in Europe, that the role of 
broadcasting in the Middle East would be similar. This is especially true when one considers the 
large illiteracy rate in the region which limited how much of the general population American 
propaganda could affect.96 Additionally and of equal importance is the role of oral tradition in 
the Middle East that made radio broadcasting an ideal medium through which to conduct 
propaganda activities.97 Lastly, access to radios increased drastically during the postwar period 
and by the late 1950s radios were widely available throughout the Middle East. Historian 
Douglas A. Boyd notes, “The ‘transistor revolution’ coincided with political movements in areas 
such as North Africa, Egypt, and Iraq” and proved powerful tools for inciting the public to 
action.98 However in spite of all these factors American broadcasting in the Middle East suffered 
from a number of obstacles in the form of competing stations and lack of quality programming 
that prevented U.S. propagandists from fully utilizing the medium.  
 This is not to say that American radio broadcasting was a neglected avenue; indeed the 
possible benefits of radio almost necessitated the United States broadcast in the region. Middle 
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East specialist Professor George Cameron from the University of Michigan told Assistant 
Secretary of State for Public Affairs Edward W. Barrett in 1951, “I fear, however, that we have 
taken inadequate accounting of the tremendous power of the radio. In Iran, every teahouse 
possesses one, and the anti-British and sometimes anti-American propaganda has seriously 
damaged our position.”99  The Voice of America, the primary vehicle for American radio 
propaganda, began broadcasts in Iran as part of its Farsi Service on March 21, 1949. The Voice’s 
Arabic service which had been cut in 1945 was resumed on January 1, 1950. As radio provided 
the avenue through which the United States could reach the largest number of listeners, the VOA 
even began broadcasting in Kurdish to rural parts of Iran and Iraq to counter Soviet broadcasting 
to those groups.100 The operating hours of the VOA increased during the 1950s although they 
peaked during times of crisis.101 The VOA Arabic broadcasts peaked during the Suez Crisis in 
1956 increasing their programming to over fourteen hours up from one hour thirty minutes.102  
 During the early 1950s the VOA suffered from the same funding pressures and 
organizational errors that plagued the information program as a whole. During its first year the 
VOA Arabic only consisted of a half hour of programming per day. This was subsequently raised 
to one hour then again to three hours which continued until 1956.103 When compared with the 
amount of programming being put forth by domestic broadcasts like Radio Cairo or even the 
popularity of BBC programming, it is clear that the Voice of America did not act as the dominant 
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radio station in the region. James Vaughan described America’s entry into radio broadcasting in 
the Middle East as “both inauspicious and belated.”104 
 The VOA struggled to compete for listeners’ attention with both the BBC and other 
services most notably Gamal Adbel Nasser’s “Voice of the Arabs.” When compared with the 
BBC the VOA was a much newer program and did not enjoy the base of support that the BBC 
enjoyed throughout the region. More notable is the perception difference between the two 
agencies. While Britain was more likely to be tied to notions of imperialism in the minds of 
Arabs, many viewed the BBC as more neutral and unbiased than the VOA. Vaughan points out 
that American officials noted the BBC benefitted from “seniority, experience and talent” and that 
“as far as Persian broadcasts were concerned, the ‘BBC is the most popular. It has the best 
voices, the best talent, the best news and dramatic shows.”105 
 Part of this issue stemmed from the perception even among USIS staff of the VOA as 
overwhelmingly propagandistic and too obsessed with communism.106 American observers 
criticized the VOA well into 1956 for its emphasis on propaganda over entertainment.107 Gary 
Rawnsley notes that the VOA faced a challenge as, “professional journalistic aspirations and 
principles of VOA were often compromised by foreign policy objectives.”108 He then goes on to 
describe this challenge as generating an “acute identity crisis” for the VOA and it is clear that 
this identity crisis is present in the Voice’s attempts to engage with Middle Eastern audiences.109 
Furthermore if we are to accept the idea that propaganda is most effective when it is judged to be 
neutral and held in high esteem by the intended audience, then it is clear that at the very least the 
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BBC was the superior broadcasting station. Indeed BBC personnel acknowledged their 
advantage as they could claim objectivity even as they designed broadcasts to coincide with 
British foreign policy aims.110 However, although the VOA was in competition with the BBC, 
many of their core objectives were similar. Thus the bigger obstacles to Voice of America 
broadcasts in the region were domestic radio broadcasts within the Middle East and the inability 
of the VOA to overcome them. 
Rawnsley describes the Voice of the Arabs—the largest and most problematic program—
as having two main functions: broadcasting propaganda abroad as well as attempting to 
manipulate rising Arab nationalist sensitivities. He notes, “Voice of the Arabs portrayed struggle 
in the most passionate symbolism – of Arabdom versus the West, Imperialism versus Liberty, 
Islam versus Evil – and this is exactly what Arab audiences wanted to hear.”111 Douglas Boyd 
mentions that when he taught in Saudi Arabia in 1963 the students developed interesting 
perspectives as a result of radio broadcasts.  He notes, “The Egyptian ‘Voice of the Arabs’ was 
popular during this period and various programs on the Egyptian station were very popular with 
the Saudi Arabian students. It became clear to me that what was broadcast was taken as the 
‘truth.”112 Long and passionate speeches by Nasser captivated the public more so than anything 
the Voice of America could possibly hope to produce.113 Indeed Nasser’s control of Arabic was a 
far cry from the accents of VOA speakers which Egyptian listeners found to be “strange” and 
“hard to understand” if they were even able to gain clear reception.114 Thus, the failures of the 
VOA cannot be solely attributed to a lack of funding or inept programming, but more accurately 
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as a fledgling agency struggling to distinguish itself from British programming and unable to 
capture opinions in the manner Voice of the Arabs and similar programs could. 
Cooperation between the United States and radio stations in Iran, Iraq, and even Egypt 
allowed American propagandists to spread materials while circumventing the credibility issues 
faced by the VOA. Before running into issues the VOA was able to establish an “intimate 
working relationship” with Radio Tehran.115 This included aiding the station with supplies as 
well as preparing USIE scripts to be read on air.116 A similar set up was present in Iraq where 
U.S. propagandists worked closely with Radio Baghdad, which the OCB would later consider 
upgrading in 1956 as a possible counter to Voice of the Arabs.117 Insight into the nature of the 
relationship can be gleaned from an Embassy memorandum from April 7, 1954 which states, 
“Much of the material being used in the Radio Baghdad campaign is being furnished by the 
USIS through the Director General of Propaganda.”118 This type of high level cooperation 
between USIS officials and government offices was not always the case, as evidenced by 
tensions in Iran however the most stunning partnership is that of the USIS and Radio Cairo. 
Cooperation with Radio Cairo ended after the Egyptian coup in 1947; however, by 1950 the 
USIS was once again working with the station. This partnership lasted throughout the 1950s in 
spite of diplomatic tensions between the United States and Egypt and a large portion of 
broadcasting material used in the Middle East was actually furnished in Cairo.119 Though not all 
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of the programming that came from the partnership was “propaganda,” it still served a vital role 
in maintaining relations with Egypt and creating propaganda for elsewhere.120 
All things considered the American radio program was competing with more entrenched 
and popular programs that boasted further skill and ability; though to discount the program as a 
failure is to both undersell the cultural impact and later respectability of the program as well as 
discount the immense disadvantage the program faced. Without the cultural impact of American 
music some of the goodwill tours would have been less effective and until its cancellation in 
1999 the Voice of America Arabic service boasted an impressive number of daily listeners who 
trusted the VOA for an accurate portrayal of American policy and relatively neutral portrayal of 
world events.121 
Print Media: from Pamphlets to Libraries 
 While radio provided perhaps the most efficient way to reach the widest audience in the 
Middle East, it was print media that formed the mainstay of American propaganda in the region. 
The United States helped build libraries, distribute books and magazines, and crafted numerous 
pamphlets and newspaper articles for dissemination in the Middle East. Taking into account the 
literacy rates for the region as a whole it may seem odd that U.S. propaganda was largely based 
around print materials. While the United States did practice public diplomacy in its widest sense, 
by distributing propaganda to all people in a target area, they also made it a practice to focus on 
winning over specific people and groups to spread the message on their behalf. In discussing the 
Jackson Committee Report the State Department noted, “The Department agrees in general with 
the statement of purpose of the information program, although it believes that ‘foreign peoples’ 
constitutes too broad and too inclusive a target, particularly for a contracting program. The 
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Department would prefer a statement of mission indicating that the program is directed at groups 
and individuals capable of significantly influencing governmental actions and popular attitudes 
in other countries.”122 These so-called “molders of opinion” consisted of local mullahs, urban 
middle classes, university students and government officials all of whom would have been able 
to read American propaganda.123  
 American propagandists were most interested in having leaders in the region spreading 
pro-American sentiments of their own accord. By having well-respected members of the 
community and those in positions of power spread pro-American—or at the very least anti-
communist—messages, the United States could be assured that their message bypassed  anti-
imperialist sentiment in the region. Another consideration in focusing on “molders of opinion” 
can be attributed to America’s overall foreign policy goals in the region. With a few small 
exceptions, the foreign policy of the United States toward the Middle East was dominated by 
containing the influence of communism and by extension the Soviet Union. U.S. officials were 
not confident during this period that the governments in the region could provide lasting 
stability. In late July 1958 for example, George V. Allen noted the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, 
“was always teetering due to lack of basic support among the people,” and called Jordan, “a 
synthetic country created after World War I, with no historic roots. Efforts to prop up the regime 
there were therefore doubly difficult.”124 Fearing that government turnover could allow for a 
communist takeover of any one country, America’s propaganda program aimed to ensure support 
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among powerful actors so that even if a government change occurred the new government would 
be pro-West. 
 For most literate people in the Middle East, access to U.S. propaganda came in the form 
of articles and columns placed in local newspapers.125 The State Department’s Wireless Bulletin 
and later the USIA’s Wireless File were disseminated by USIS field posts throughout the Middle 
East.126 According to the Undersecretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, the bulletin served two 
purposes, “(a) To provide USIS staffs with fast official news and background material for 
placement in the foreign press, and (b) To keep post staffs informed of daily domestic and 
foreign developments to assist them in their official duties.”127 For the most part, USIS posts 
acted with a considerable amount of autonomy in deciding what material to distribute and how; 
this allowed them to tailor the material to needs of specific regions. Matthews stated, “As the 
enlarged field staffs have become more experienced and more familiar with their local problems, 
there has been a decided trend away from the mass-distribution or ‘assembly-line’ type of field 
operation and toward the selective-servicing, personal-influence method of operation.”128  
The typical distribution of the file consisted of four different methods. “Press Releases” 
were quick single stories taken from the larger file and distributed to local press rather than the 
general public. Taken as a single story, the press releases stood a better chance of being seen 
than when they were part of the much larger bulletin file. Similarly, “Special Article Placement” 
consisted of placing selected stories of import in targeted local press and periodicals. Sometimes 
USIS staff could convince local writers to craft the stories themselves if given suitable 
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background on an issue—a strategy that echoes the “Arab/Iranian voices” theme.129 The 
“Official Bulletin” was a slightly longer report that consisted mostly of background information. 
This report was not actively distributed as propaganda except to some local opinion leaders and 
was mostly intended for U.S. consulates and the legation.130 Lastly, weekly newsletters were a 
more locally tailored weekly or biweekly background and summary report that took the form of 
magazines. 
The USIS weekly newsletters were able to project “how” and “why” insight into news 
reports as well as entertainment features to appeal to a wider base. According to USIS posts the 
weekly newsletters, “have enabled USIS to focus more attention on the longer-range significance 
of official U.S. news developments and tie their output more closely in with policy 
guidances.”131  The USIS newsletters formed the backbone of American magazine production in 
the Middle East. As noted by James Vaughan, “Under the USIA, the American magazine 
programme in the Middle East was dominated by two publications, News Review/Al Akhbar and 
Al Sadaka, produced in Beirut and Cairo, respectively.”132 The Lebanese “U.S.A. News Review” 
was a weekly magazine that mixed pictures, entertainment, and a news summary. The newsletter 
was released in 1950 and had a strong base in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq where Arabic 
circulation rose from less than 20,000 in 1952 to approximately 80,000 by 1956.133 The Cairo 
based Al Sadaka began circulation in 1952 and maintained production of approximately 55,000 
throughout the 1950s with most of its readers in Egypt.134 Both magazine programs acted as a 
toned down version of the USIA Wireless File that stressed accessibility over strength of content. 
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Vaughan describes the content of these newsletters as “sugar-coated” and USIS officials noted 
that in some ways it was necessary to play the role of a tabloid to further their message.135 
Another important function of the USIS posts in the Middle East was managing USIS 
libraries. Kenneth Osgood notes that books formed the most important weapon of U.S. 
propaganda and that the production and circulation of books became a primary focus of the 
American propaganda program.136 Osgood notes at least one source that described the USIS 
libraries as “the single most effective part of our entire information operation,” and while this 
statement may be excessive, there can be little doubt that the libraries found great success in the 
Middle East.137 The program was widely distributed with over forty libraries throughout the Near 
East region (which includes but is not limited to the Middle East) by 1954. Reports regarding the 
libraries were mostly positive. The opening of the library in Cairo in 1946 was greeted as a 
significant development in cultural relations and the opening of facilities in Amman in 1953 was 
similarly greeted with enthusiastic welcome.138  
Daily visitors numbered in the hundreds however this number must be tempered against 
the types of visitors the library serviced. Dizard notes that large numbers of visitors could cause 
lines and that, “USIS libraries crowded with students and other readers throughout the day.”139 
While the library was primarily aimed toward and used by students, the democratic nature of the 
libraries meant anyone could enter. A particularly poignant example of this is noted by George 
V. Allen in an article he wrote for The Atlantic Monthly in 1961.140 When acting as director of 
the USIA he asked a Jordanian student about her experience with the USIS library to which she 
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replied it had been discouraging and noted, “I took a book from the shelf and sat at a table to 
read. Next to me sat a Bedouin who looked as if he had just come from his cattle. His hands were 
filthy. I did not like to handle a book which has doubtless been held by hands like that, so I did 
not go back.”141 U.S. propagandists were primarily concerned with attracting students and 
educated elite over visitors such as the Bedouin man, however they believed any restrictions 
would go against the democratic nature of American-style libraries. 
The success of the libraries is in part related to their perceived neutrality. Outside of the 
McCarthy investigations that resulted in the temporary removal of some books from USIS 
libraries—which nearly singlehandedly destroyed the credibility of the libraries—the libraries 
appeared to largely support a position of neutrality. Shawn Parry-Giles states that McCarthy was 
at least partially correct in his evaluation of the libraries. USIS libraries contained books with 
questionable communist ties as a means of “balanced presentation” that allowed the United 
States to express a commitment to freedom of information even as they consciously highlighted 
and downplayed some sources.142 Library materials were divided into four categories that 
dictated how much exposure a source was given among the general public: maximum promotion, 
normal use, conditional use, and not suitable.143 Thus while U.S. propagandists carefully selected 
which books were seen most, they largely appeared as neutral information hubs. Additionally, 
local politics could also affect what libraries carried. In the Middle East USIS libraries did not 
carry Zionist material as it “would be impolitic to do so.”144 However in spite of this policy at 
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least one gaffe exists where Zionist material was discovered in an Arabic post prompting an 
investigation.145  
Perhaps due to their success (the reason cited by U.S. officials) and overt connection with 
the United States the USIS libraries were prone to anti-American outbursts. The U.S. News and 
World Report detailed sixty-eight major incidents of damage to USIS libraries in the period from 
1945 to 1965, a number confirmed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.146 The 
USIS libraries in Cairo and Alexandria were among the targets of a 1954 Israeli Defense 
Ministry plot to plant bombs and set fires to foment anti-Egyptian sentiment in the United 
States.147 On July 20, 1957 a dynamite charge was set off at the USIS library in Beirut. Less than 
a year later, on May 10, 1958, the library in Tripoli, Lebanon was attacked, resulting in 
widespread destruction of books and forcing that location to close.148 USIS libraries in Egypt 
also suffered a series of attacks in the early 1960s including a devastating attack on the Cairo 
location that forced relocation and caused damages in excess of $400,000 USD. In 1961 the 
windows of the USIS Jefferson Library in Alexandria were smashed by protesting students.149 In 
fact destruction of the plate glass windows that were nearly ubiquitous at USIS libraries was so 
common worldwide as a form of protest that it did not escape the domestic critics and 
cartoonists.150 
Lastly, in addition to providing libraries for Middle Eastern readers to access books, the 
United States also subsidized low cost book publishing and sponsored the creation of a state-
private network that allowed massive numbers of American books to flow into the Middle East. 
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The creation of material as well as the facilitation of works deemed useful to the program was a 
major feature of the U.S. program during the 1950s. State Department correspondence with one 
publisher noted in 1952, “shortly before the end of the fiscal year the Embassy at Cairo 
negotiated contracts with some five or six Egyptian publishers calling for the translation and 
publication of some fifty books.”151 By the end of this period the United States had become the 
number one exporter of books in the world and nearly two billion had been subsidized by the 
USIA.152 In regard to pro-Western manuscripts produced by the USIA, Osgood posits, 
“Undoubtedly many more were commissioned in the 1950s, as USIA correspondence files reveal 
that the stimulation of books was a routine practice of USIS posts abroad.”153 The CIA also 
joined in the business of covert book publishing and distribution, because the agency also 
recognized the value of books as a strategic weapon. The CIA participation in the publishing 
business was obviously covert; however, even in cases where connections and funding from the 
United States were not “hidden” they were not openly known.154 
The formation of state-private networks was key to the American book distribution and 
especially important in the Middle East. For example Victor Weybright, founder and chairman of 
the New American Library, a New York based publisher, toured the Middle East in 1951 at the 
behest of the State Department. In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of State, Weybright 
discussed his cooperation in addressing the State Department’s requests for cheap book 
distribution. He underscored the furtive nature of his cooperation with the government by noting, 
“Actually, I leaned over backward everywhere I went to not involve any of your foreign 
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representatives in distribution matters. Off the record, in certain places such as Egypt where 
exchange has to be contrived by the distributor that I established there, it would be embarrassing 
for the Government to be involved.”155 
The most prominent example of state-private cooperation in book distribution in the 
Middle East was Franklin Publications. While its services were eventually expanded worldwide, 
Franklin Publications was founded in June 1952 to provide books specifically to the Middle East. 
In its first year the State Department allotted $500,000 in exchange for a contract with the 
publisher, the details of which stated, “Franklin Publications first operations under its contract 
with the Department will be in the field of translations and in the Arabic-language areas…the 
corporation hopes to be able to carry on a broader program of book publishing and distribution 
with foundation and other non-governmental support in general accord with the Department’s 
objectives.”156 By agreeing to work in accordance with State Department objectives, Franklin 
Publications became a part of the American public diplomacy effort. This ensured a steady 
supply of pro-Western books to the literate population of the Middle East. 
As with other government-sponsored book distribution programs, the connection between 
the State Department and Franklin Publications was obfuscated although not denied. Department 
correspondence with the company instructed the publisher to, “on one hand, avoid the kind of 
association with American political and information activities that would aggravate the suspicion 
as to your motives that will undoubtedly be encountered in any case,” while on the other hand, 
“be prepared candidly to admit that the operations of Franklin are aided by contributions from 
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the State Department.”157 Osgood points out, “By the end of 1960, Franklin Publications had 
printed some 10.5 million books,” and that “By 1965, it had helped to translate and to publish 43 
million copies of 2,500 different titles.”158 According to Dizard, “A decade after Franklin began 
operations, American books had captured 70 percent of the translated book market in Arab 
countries.”159 Overall, the American print propaganda effort focused on balancing long term and 
short term public diplomacy. Franklin Publications and the USIS libraries formed a long term 
commitment to shifting attitudes in the Middle East while the Wireless Bulletin and smaller print 
operations attempted to steer short term opinion in favor of U.S. policies. Print media overall was 
focused on the much smaller literate population of the Middle East and was aimed at instilling 
pro-Western sentiment over a long period of time. By the later 1950s book distribution and 
libraries had started to eclipse propaganda in newspapers and even there the propaganda was 
much more subtle and seemingly neutral than during the 1940s and early 1950s. 
Education as Propaganda 
 As students provided a unique opportunity to mold the opinions and attitudes of potential 
future leaders, the American propaganda program did not neglect any opportunities to reach such 
an important audience. Program plans in Iran note, “University professors and students, 
secondary school teachers and students, professional men, including government employees – 
are a most important group as they represent the public opinion molders, leading the multiplicity 
of movements now current in Iran.”160 The USIS libraries and book translation and distribution 
programs were no doubt influential and form part of the American strategy toward students; 
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however, there were more overt attempts to capture young hearts and minds. American led 
universities and exchange programs formed the center of these attempts. 
 The United States boasted strong educational roots in the region that allowed U.S. 
propagandists a firm and trusted base from which to work; Vaughan points out, “the United 
States could look back on a distinguished history of involvement in Middle Eastern education 
dating back to the establishment of missionary colleges in the nineteenth century.”161 The most 
prominent university operating in the Middle East was the American University at Beirut (AUB). 
Founded in 1866 as a Protestant college, AUB formed the backbone of the American 
institutional education program and was recognized by American propagandists as a distinct 
cultural weapon when university policy aligned with regional policy. By the early 1950s 
enrollment approximated 3000 students, nearly half of the estimated 7000 students enrolled in 
American universities in the Near East.162  
However while the AUB represented a potent weapon for shaping young minds the 
degree to which the university actively aligned with U.S. policy must be evaluated to determine 
its place within the propaganda program. If the policy under Dr. Stephen B. L. Penrose Jr, 
president from 1948 through his death in 1954, can be taken as indicative of the larger attitude of 
the college then it stands to reason that the AUB did largely cooperate with State Department 
aims in the region. Penrose was concerned about active Soviet intrusion into the region as a 
whole and especially among the students. He wrote directly to the State Department to notify 
them of his concerns and detail his expulsion of a communist-affiliated student.163 These actions 
indicate an actively pro-West attitude present in the university and cooperation with State 
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Department aims. We know that as early as the Second World War, the United States was 
considering the use of American affiliated universities as cultural diplomacy tools and discussed 
the need for covert funding of the AUB and Robert College in Istanbul.164 Özlem Altan-Olcay 
points to a 1961 report by the Middle East Survey Commission that holds two expectations of 
Robert College graduates, “First, Robert College graduates were expected to serve a significant 
purpose by building amiable bridges between the United States and Turkey. The writers also 
stressed the institution’s ability to form channels of communication and knowledge transfer.”165 
While the United States could not actively interfere with university business it was expected that 
the universities would follow U.S. policy generally and inculcate graduates with pro-Western 
lines of thought. 
Outside of American universities in the region, students from the Middle East were also 
invited to study in the United States through various programs. Exchange students were expected 
to absorb American culture and ideals and return to spread these ideas in their native countries. 
The International Visitors (IV) program invited promising youths selected by USIS officers to 
tour the United States and view American life and ideals firsthand. A number of these visitors 
became prominent leaders in their respective regions, including later president of Egypt Anwar 
Sadat.166 American propagandists noted these programs were capable of “modifying the 
competence and/or general attitude of an individual foreigner. Experience has proven that, when 
properly handled, it can have powerful psychological effects.”167 Of these exchange programs 
none was more famous or widespread than the Fulbright. Founded in 1946, the Fulbright 
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Program was named for Senator J. William Fulbright (R.-Ark.) who suggested military surplus 
be sold to pay for two-way educational swaps between the United States and foreign powers to 
facilitate cultural relations.  
By the late 1940s, the Fulbright Program was making headway into the Middle East. An 
educational exchange deal was signed with Egypt in November 1949 and deals with Iraq and 
Syria were completed by the end of 1950. By the end of the 1950s the United States was hosting 
students from nearly all countries throughout the Middle East with significant numbers of 
students coming from Iraq, Jordan, and Iran.168 American “Fulbrighters” in the Middle East also 
played a significant role by disseminating American ideology and acting as cultural 
ambassadors. State Department records state, “Prior to the program, there were no American 
professors in teaching positions in Egypt outside the American-sponsored institutions; today, 
American professors are not only accepted, but in demand.”169 In Egypt, Osgood points out one 
Fulbright instructor who “distributed ‘innumerable’ USIS publications to approximately twenty 
different English-language clubs in local secondary schools.”170 Like the American universities 
in the region, the Fulbright program and other exchange programs were highly successful in 
promoting American ideals among “target groups.”  
Education and student transfer were key to American goals of influencing the future 
leaders of the region. By asserting the role of the United States in higher education they could 
simultaneously block the influence of communism in universities (which they believed could be 
a fertile breeding ground) and create an intellectual culture founded on pro-Western ideology. 
Combined with print media, these two areas were the most crucial to the U.S. public diplomacy 
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program because they directly addressed American concerns of communism arising in young 
leaders and revolutionaries. 
Cultural Diplomacy: Projecting American Life 
 Aside from educating the people of the Middle East to think like Americans and support 
American policies, another objective of the American public diplomacy effort in the region was 
the projection of the “American way of life” and what it meant to “be an American.” Dizard 
explains that while the “informational” programs and “cultural” programs were sometimes 
conceived of as separate, it was often difficult to make such a clear-cut distinction in practice.171 
The USIS libraries, for example, were primarily geared toward information about the United 
States; but, they also held cultural exhibits on American life and held large collections of music 
as well as inviting musical performances and collaboration. Ostensibly by popularizing 
American culture the United States would enjoy greater support for its policies as American 
value systems were adopted by foreign peoples. 
Cultural diplomacy was also intended to show solidarity of American culture with that of 
the Middle East. For example, Americans pointed to the religious nature of the United States and 
used the incompatibility of religion with communism to appeal to Islamic culture in the Middle 
East. In regard to the incompatibility of Islam with communism, embassy plans for Iraq note, 
“The Working Group should consider ways of issuing, on a continuing basis, material of the type 
that was contained in the Soviet Affairs Note on ‘Muslims in the USSR.’ The problem is ever 
present of convincing the educated Iraqis that conditions would be worse under a communist 
regime than they are in the Arab world today.”172 The United States was aware of and supported 
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attempts to gain the support of Islamic cultural groups to spread the belief that communism 
posed a threat and report on the activities of communist groups.173 Eisenhower himself stressed 
that he was always quick to bring up the shared religious beliefs of the United States and those in 
the Middle East and stated, “I assure you that I never fail in any communication with Arab 
leaders, oral or written, to stress the importance of the spiritual factor in our relationships. I have 
argued that belief in God should create between them and us the common purpose of opposing 
atheistic communism.”174 The United States sponsored a number of exhibits and conventions; 
one such example is an ‘Islamic colloquium’ meant to bring together top scholars in the Middle 
East with American intellectuals. State Department documents provide a clear picture of the 
intent behind these conventions,  
On the surface, this colloquium looks like an exercise in pure learning. This in 
effect is the impression we desire to give. IIA [International Information Agency] 
promoted the colloquium along these lines and has given it financial and other assistance 
because we consider this psychological approach is an important contribution at this time 
to both short term and long term United States political objectives in the Moslem area.175 
While cultural diplomacy took a variety of forms the most overt and widespread attempts in the 
Middle East were conducted through film and music. 
 The United States dominated film, more so than any other medium, and made it a potent 
weapon for cultural diplomacy. Hollywood’s hegemonic control over production meant that 
while it was possible for Egyptian radio entertainment to influence the region based on quality, it 
was American films that worldwide audiences turned to for entertainment. As early as 1945 
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President Roosevelt suggested the “furnishing of American moving pictures” in the Near East.176 
Colonel Harold B. Hoskins—an Arabist State Department official—noted that the British had 
shown films outdoors on walls which had proved effective. Roosevelt concluded this was 
perhaps better than using theatres because it would allow American films to reach both men and 
women (who would be otherwise excluded).177 The idea of impromptu theatres led to the 
creation of the Mobile Film Unit, special models from the Jeep Willys company with reinforced 
roofs that allowed a projectionist to show films from atop the vehicle.178 These mobile units also 
distributed publications, set up exhibits and met with local officials as part of their larger 
duties.179 Lee Dinsmore, a PAO working in the Kurdish area of Iraq, embodied the best aspects 
of the mobile units; in addition to his duties he learned Kurdish and was instrumental in 
extending US educational exchange opportunities to young Kurds.180  
 Internal documents from the Iranian Department of Propaganda captured by the United 
States give us additional insight into how the Mobile Film Unit operated and how it was 
perceived by locals and foreign governments.181 Initially most films offered were educational in 
nature, featuring some mention of US government sponsorship at the beginning, and were well-
received; Iranian officials note, “A remarkable warm welcome is being given to our units now 
that people have learned more about the nature of their work. In very few places have they been 
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confronted with opposition on the part of the people.”182 Sometimes American attempts at 
cultural diplomacy did not work as intended, especially when American materials highlighted the 
wealth disparity between the United States and more rural and impoverished areas in the Middle 
East. While these glimpses of Americana were meant to extoll the benefits of choosing the 
American system over communism, they sometimes led to difficult questions such as, “If one 
fourth of that amount [to produce a specific bulletin] was to be made available in medicines or in 
some other more tangible product of your country which could be used to lessen poverty or to 
better the health of my people, would it not be a far more successful propaganda approach?”183 
The Iranian document recalls a very similar story, “In some places the inhabitants asked for 
medicine rather than films but when our projectionists explained to them that first they had to 
acquire some knowledge and learn how to deal with a sick person.”184 These mistakes were made 
with less frequency as the program moved forward. The United States became more familiar 
with local audiences and learned to which demographics it should target certain types of 
propaganda. The document also shows that the Iranian government was suitably impressed with 
the success of the Mobile Film Units; however, it expressed concern for the credit being given to 
the United States as well as the close relations between the units and the USIE offices, though 
this concern was expressed in January 1953 and dissipated following the return of the Shah and 
Mossadeq’s ousting in August.185 
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The Iranian report also mentions the possible need to allow for films that were primarily 
intended as entertainment.186 American officials had already recognized a need to provide 
content in a more entertaining and accessible form of propaganda film. In 1950 the Embassy in 
Tehran noted, “The Embassy wonders if, in the light of the increasing tempo of the cold war, Mr. 
Disney as a patriotic duty could be interested in preparing a film that could be used to defend 
democracy where the communist system is being touted loudly. The Iranian people like clever 
satire and the Disney style is known and liked here, therefore the combination of the two would 
provide a very strong media for putting across out message.”187 Undoubtedly when it came to 
entertainment Hollywood, and by extension the United States, was the greatest force in the film 
industry. American films were routinely shown more often than other films, with only Egyptian 
numbers appearing somewhat comparable.188 Vaughan tells us that Egypt became the center of a 
substantial film program with attendance ranging from approximately 100,000 persons in 1947—
which he accurately points to as the low-point in post-war propaganda—to over 300,000 
attendees in 1948.189 These numbers did not refer solely to Hollywood productions but also USIS 
propaganda and educational films. There were occasional issues with these films along similar 
lines as those encountered in the Mobile Film Units such as depictions of American values 
differing from traditional values.190 
Lastly, the U.S. public diplomacy effort through film included the use of short newsreels. 
The USIA furnished a number of newsreels that were not attributed to the agency such as News 
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of the Day (distributed by Fox Movietone) and ‘KINGFISH.’191 In Iran, the Embassy in Tehran 
noted the success of their connection with the Universal International Newsreel stating, “In short, 
the theatrical distribution of this reel has been very successful to date and the Embassy hopes that 
the Department will continue to support the United Newsreel project,” and that “The Embassy 
would like to see a wider theatrical distribution.”192 While U.S. propagandists did face some 
challenges in getting wide circulation of the newsreels without alerting local exhibitors to their 
connections and thus tainting their popularity, it can be said that the US was generally very 
successful in getting their newsreels distributed and these were well-liked. The only mention of 
significant disturbance was following the screening of a USIA film on the Kennedy assassination 
in 1965. Even in this case however it was the USIS library that was attacked and connections 
between the film and attack are tenuous.193 
As a form of cultural diplomacy, music served to counter the belief that America lacked a 
definitive culture as well as make propaganda more palatable during broadcasts. Vaughan states, 
“Music, whether classical or popular, Western or Arabic, was often used by British and 
American broadcasters as a means of attracting an audience and ‘sugaring the pill’ of more 
overtly political propaganda content,” and “American propagandists led the way in incorporating 
music into their national projection material.”194 In regard to classical music, American 
composers aided the State Department by dedicating concerts to specific Middle Eastern cities 
which were later broadcast on the VOA or local stations.195 However the true strength of 
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American cultural diplomacy through music came in the form of a uniquely American genre—
jazz. 
Jazz and swing music were uniquely American in nature and one does not exist in the mind 
without the other. Jazz was increasingly popular in the Middle East, playing on VOA and local 
stations such as the Egyptian State Broadcasting (ESB).196 Jazz was also bound to the racial 
issues inherent to the United States, issues that provided Soviet propagandists plenty of material 
to work with and made foreign audiences wary. The strategy employed by the United States to 
combat negative perceptions of American race relations was to admit their existence and claim 
that in spite of the current negative state of affairs American democracy allowed for future 
change.197 The United States began a campaign to send abroad African-American talents who 
would espouse this message and sooth foreign audiences’ concerns.198 In the Middle East the 
most popular and powerful goodwill ambassadors were jazz musicians following the suggestion 
of African-American Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. that the United States use Dizzy 
Gillespie to allay overseas concerns.199 The very first ‘jam-bassador tour’ led by Dizzy Gillespie 
in 1956 traveled through Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey.200 Penny Von Eschen posits 
that these countries were chosen deliberately in an attempt to fortify the Middle East from Soviet 
influence.201 Some of the notable artists to visit the Middle East included Dizzy Gillespie, Duke 
Ellington, Louis Armstrong, Dave Brubeck and Quincy Jones. Through live performances, radio 
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broadcasts and collections housed in the USIS libraries, the United States used the popularity of 
music to generate goodwill throughout the Middle East and encourage closer cultural transfer. 
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Chapter 5: The Program’s Legacy 
 Having analyzed the historical context of the America’s propaganda program and the 
methods through which it was implemented, an analysis of its successes and failures is also 
necessary. Several factors impeded the effectiveness of the program; however these impediments 
did not prevent the program from having any successes. Most of all, it is necessary to 
differentiate between any failings of the program due to ineptitude and poor implementation and 
those stemming from larger issues that were, frankly, beyond the scope of the program. 
 James Vaughan, in The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle 
East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds, posits that the propaganda program of the United States 
was largely a failure due to a fundamental misunderstanding of its intended audience as well as a 
rigid focus on an agenda that focused on communism and the Soviet Union rather than more 
immediate regional issues.202 Vaughan’s definition of failure is based on, “the formulation rather 
than the reception of Western propaganda and makes no claim to have solved the problems 
inherent in any effort to appreciate the impact of propaganda upon a foreign audience.”203 This 
paper takes a similar approach by omitting an in-depth analysis of shifting attitudes among 
Middle Eastern audiences. 
Instead of focusing wholly on the success and/or failure of American propaganda in the 
region I seek to offer a differing appreciation for the planning and implementation of the 
program. Rather than place any failings of the program solely in the hands of American 
propagandists, I posit that U.S. officials were indeed aware of the issues of import to Middle 
Eastern audiences and that “orientalism” and myopia played a relatively small role in impeding 
propaganda efforts. By “orientalism,” both Vaughan and I are referring to the term put forward 
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by Edward Said regarding an imagined and exaggerated difference between “Orient” and 
“Occident” by imperialist nations.204 Regional power struggles and an ingrained anti-imperialist 
sentiment largely relegated Western efforts to affect the region to a secondary status and 
guaranteed any propaganda effort would be at a disadvantage.  
The first part of Vaughan’s argument details how Western policymakers operated under, 
“an analysis of the region and its peoples that was steeped in an ‘Orientalist’ tradition.”205 As a 
result of this orientalist view, Western propaganda efforts were discordant with the mindsets of 
those considered “politically conscious.”206 It cannot be denied that stereotypes about the Middle 
East abounded in the American consciousness, and indeed the region was considered separate 
from “the West,” but I contend that whatever orientalist stigma may have existed was largely 
contained in Washington and that the individual USIS posts were much more attuned to the 
needs of local audiences. Vaughan does note, “Orientalism, racism, anti-Semitism and other 
stereotypes did not necessarily dominate the formation of propaganda policy in the Middle 
East.”207 I assert that rather than calling attention to deficiencies in the American approach to 
regional diplomacy, instead any orientalism in Washington underscores a gap between American 
policy emanating from Washington and the propaganda program. 
With the notable exception of former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Jefferson Caffrey, the 
sources Vaughan uses to suggest an orientalist view among American officials are largely 
contained to documents originating from the PSB, NSC and the State Department. Such attitudes 
that existed in these departments may not have ever reached Middle Eastern audiences, 
especially if one recalls the shift in USIS operations mentioned by Undersecretary of State H. 
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Freeman Matthews from an “assembly line” publication of the Wireless File to a more concerted 
effort to tailor propaganda to local audiences.208 A 1953 letter from the American Embassy in 
Iraq noted dissatisfaction with the higher levels of the State Department stating, “there was not 
the necessary appreciation to get our point across,” and underscores the disparity between 
thinking in Washington and the field.209 Following a trip to USIS posts abroad, USIA Director 
Theodore Streibert decided that basic decisions should be left to USIS Public Affairs Officers 
and decided at the embassy level rather than in Washington.210 In response to a State Department 
suggestion to screen the propaganda film Two Cities, propagandists in Tehran declined stating, 
“The Iranian people like clever satire and the Disney style is known and liked here, therefore the 
combination of the two would provide a very strong media for putting across our message. A 
technique of lampooning the communist system without mentioning it as such would be better 
received than the heavy-handed technique evident in TWO CITIES.”211 This statement reflects 
that local offices had a greater understanding of Middle Eastern audiences as well as the relative 
level of autonomy exerted by the field offices.  
If there was a major issue between the regional offices and Washington, it was not that 
orientalism and racism tainted the propaganda program, but rather that the propaganda program 
and national policies were not fully integrated. Dizard notes John Foster Dulles and the NSC had 
a “disdain” for the USIA and that this limited the ability of the program to conform with overall 
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American policies toward the region.212 This disconnect is also recognized by Vaughan although 
he recommends, “one should be wary of stretching the point too far.”213 On the contrary the 
cooperation between the USIA and overall foreign policy objectives should not be overly relied 
upon. Throughout the Truman administration the propaganda program was largely excluded 
from policymaking. It was only after the Jackson Report and Eisenhower restructures that the 
program gained entry into the highest levels of policymaking through the OCB and NSC.  
Though it may have attained a greater appreciation due to Eisenhower’s esteem for the 
program the USIA was unable to escape its outsider status in the policymaking process. Laura 
Belmonte tells us that throughout the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies U.S. policymakers 
“seldom accorded information activities status equal to other tools of U.S. foreign policy.”214 On 
the other hand, Vaughan cites the Sprague Commission—a presidential committee to evaluate 
the implementation of the Jackson Report—as evidence of the propaganda program’s increased 
role in foreign policy.215 This position differs greatly from Dizard who notes that while the 
commission validated the effectiveness of the program it lamented the USIA’s weak role in 
policy formation.216 While Vaughan is somewhat correct insofar as the USIA was much more 
integrated than prior to the writing of the Jackson Committee Report, Dizard’s analysis is closer 
to the sentiment of the Sprague Commission which reads, “Thus personnel familiar with 
informational techniques and foreign public opinion are increasingly involved in the decision-
making process. However, there appears to be a need for further improving their regular and 
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effective involvement in major policy problems.”217 In regard to the Middle East, Gary Rawnsley 
posits that part of the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine lies in the fact that the USIA was not 
heavily consulted beforehand and had it played a larger role in the policymaking process it could 
have advocated a more popular and better received reaction throughout the region.218 Having 
considered all of these factors, the Jackson Committee Report’s assertion that psychological 
considerations were not separable from policy is perhaps best understood as a goal rather than 
the actual political reality.219 
Another consideration for the propaganda program’s integration with foreign policy 
objectives is the relation of governmental operations to private enterprises as well as cooperation 
with foreign programs. The Jackson Committee Report concluded that in regard to private 
organizations, “The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will 
more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over content.”220 While this was a 
more viable approach for achieving success in a propaganda sense, it creates gaps between 
execution and planning. In a large number of cases the government actively took a backseat to 
private programs and foreign companies.221 Relying on private and foreign representatives to 
disseminate propaganda holds a host of problems not least of which is how much of the 
confidential foreign policy can be shared. If the distribution options that were viewed as the most 
trustworthy were not trusted with the intimate details of the foreign policy, they were not being 
fully utilized. In some cases contacts were not always distributing material that could be 
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classified as propaganda. For example, cooperation with the Egyptian Broadcasting Station was 
not always “strictly propagandistic” though it did contribute toward overall goodwill.222 
Although a less propagandistic approach could limit the program’s integration with short-
term policy objectives, it also provided for some of the greater successes of the program. 
Arguably the United States had the most success in its cultural operations as Middle Eastern 
audiences gravitated toward American music, movies and products. Describing the limits of U.S. 
cultural diplomacy Vaughan notes, “The primacy of short-term political objectives, driven by the 
contingencies of the cold war, was thus quickly established,” and concludes, “American cultural 
diplomacy was thus hampered by a school of opinion in the State Department that regarded it as 
‘a minor appendage to Information, with little value or significance in itself.”223 This focus on 
short-term objectives severely hampered the more successful programs that relied on a much 
longer strategy emphasizing gradual bonds developing between the United States and the Middle 
East. Major shifts in opinion were largely unsuccessful in short-term projects and Laura 
Belmonte accurately describes American propagandists as “whipsawed” as they attempted to 
adapt to ever-changing policy and domestic shifts.224 
Other factors limited the program as well. Maintaining sufficient funding proved to be an 
issue throughout this era especially during the initial stages of the Truman administration. The 
Campaign of Truth was a much needed influx of funding; however, it proved to be an anomaly 
rather than the norm. Even as Eisenhower pushed for expansion of the program, Congressional 
disapproval and political maneuverings combined to ensure that a steady growth of the program 
was anything but assured. In spite of this, the funding for the program was relatively steady if not 
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always guaranteed, and the program in the Middle East benefitted as the region increased in 
importance relative to programs behind the Iron Curtain. 
As with the funding issues, bureaucratic disorganization and infighting continued into the 
Eisenhower presidency albeit as much less of a problem. Continual reorganizations were a theme 
of the Truman administration’s attempts to construct the program and while they were greatly 
reduced thanks to the formation of the USIA, much of the competition and disdain for competing 
agencies continued. Relations between the USIA and CIA remained low throughout the period as 
the USIA considered itself to be the sole body responsible for psychological propaganda actions. 
The USIA viewed the CIA as overstepping its bounds and doing so in a wholly incompetent 
manner.225  
The United States was also forced to consider British actions in the formulation of 
strategy, especially up through the mid-1950s. The United States took on a secondary role to the 
far more entrenched and experienced British program during its initial entry to the Middle East. 
Anti-imperialist attitudes forced the United States to tread a precariously thin line. On the one 
hand, it was necessary for the United States to show solidarity with its close ally, the United 
Kingdom. Any policies that seemed to condemn the United Kingdom explicitly would strain 
relations.226 On the other hand, the United Kingdom was quickly losing prestige in the Middle 
East and found it far more challenging to escape accusations of imperialist motives. In order to 
maintain the position that the United States was truly committed to the actual needs of Middle 
Eastern audiences and defend American credibility, it was necessary to either distance itself from 
British policy or attempt to otherwise convince those in the Middle East that British actions were 
truly beneficial. This approach reached a logical conclusion during the Suez Crisis. In order to 
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maintain its larger Cold War policies—including stable borders in the Middle East and the ability 
to admonish the Soviet Union for its actions in Hungary—the United States was forced to take a 
drastic turn from supporting the United Kingdom and France. Vaughan points out however, it 
was the British who failed to comprehend American policy and willingness to adhere to it and 
willfully split from the American program.227 In any case it is hard to argue that such a split was 
inevitable; however, the broad goals of the United States and the United Kingdom varied 
sufficiently to induce competition and mistrust that hurt the ability of the U.S. to pursue its own 
agenda. The United States only partially split from its partnership with the United Kingdom on 
this issue, but it was significant enough that when combined with the diminished British 
influence on the region allowed the United States public diplomacy to plot an independent 
course. 
Conclusion 
 As this paper has demonstrated the U.S. felt the need to implement a foreign information 
program under President Truman, which was later expanded and corrected under Eisenhower, 
and included a switch from short-term objective seeking to long-term goodwill fostering. The 
methods were primarily focused on two target audiences: educated community leaders on one 
hand, and the masses on the other.  
The American propaganda program in the Middle East during the early Cold War period 
faced a number of challenges stemming from systemic sources such as funding, organization and 
role in policymaking as well as from external constraints from foreign interests (both British and 
Middle Eastern), anti-imperialist sentiments, and the delicate balance between credibility and 
adherence to promoting policy. Many of the issues that hampered early attempts during the 
Truman administration were helped by the Campaign of Truth and the Eisenhower 
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administration took these efforts a step further. The program was carried out through a variety of 
covert and semi-covert methods aimed at garnering credibility through apparently independent 
agencies. Many of these programs were successful at producing some shifts in public opinion, 
most notably the CIA operation to discredit Prime Minister Mossadeq in Iran.  
 Overall however it was not the short-term operations that were most successful but rather 
the longer cultural projection of the United States into the region. The United States capitalized 
on Middle Eastern audiences’ desire for American books, movies, and magazines. Cultural 
trends during this period reflect a shift toward American dress and musical taste. The realization 
of the strengths of the long term approach only gained prominence toward the end of the 
Eisenhower presidency. Ultimately the propaganda program in the Middle East was an 
experiment in how best to conduct public diplomacy. American propagandists realized by the 
end of the period that building goodwill and cultural ties was a more effective strategy than 
playing damage control for unfavorable policies. 
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